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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the relation between insider trading and the likelihood of 
insolvency with a specific focus on the directors’ sale and purchase transactions preceding 
insolvency. We use a unique dataset on directors’ dealings in 474 non-financial UK firms, of 
which 117 filed for insolvency, over the period 2000-2010. We show that the directors of 
insolvent firms increase their purchase transactions significantly as the insolvency 
approaches. The results also reveal a significantly positive relation between net purchases and 
the likelihood of insolvency, which is observed only during the last six-month trading period. 
The relation is negative for the earlier trading periods. While the earlier purchase transactions 
appear to be motivated by superior information held by insiders, the purchase trades closer to 
the insolvency date are possibly initiated by directors’ motives to influence the market’s 
perception of the firm in an attempt to avert or delay insolvency.    
 
JEL classification: G33; G34 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate bankruptcies
2
 have serious consequences for creditors as well as owners of 
firms. When a firm goes bankrupt, the value of shareholders’ claims on the firm’s assets 
normally becomes zero and creditors can expect to recover their claims only partially because 
of the costs of bankruptcy. The size of these costs is determined mainly by the nature of the 
bankrupt firm’s assets, the complexity of its business and financial structure, the firm’s size 
and agency conflicts between directors, shareholders and debt holders (for an extensive 
review see Altman and Hotchkiss 2006). Furthermore, the costs that are born by managers 
can be more significant as their reputation and human capital are damaged in bankruptcy 
(Eckbo, Thorburn and Wang 2012; Gilson 1989). The costs implications have led researchers 
to investigate the factors that are likely to be associated with corporate bankruptcies. 
However, while there has been considerable research examining the factors contributing to 
the likelihood of bankruptcy (see, e.g., Altman 1968; Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi 2008; 
Hillegeist et al. 2004; Ohlson 1980), the extent to which insider trading is relevant in 
explaining corporate bankruptcies is largely unknown. This paper aims to fill this gap by 
investigating empirically the relation between inside trading and the likelihood of insolvency 
in the UK. 
Insider trading is relevant to the investigation of corporate bankruptcies for at least two 
reasons. First, it is recognised that insiders have a better insight into their companies’ 
prospects and hence have informational advantage over outside investors. Therefore, while 
insiders trade on the superior information they hold, outsiders can make abnormal profits by 
replicating insiders’ trading strategies. Prior studies of insider trading indeed provide strong 
evidence in support of this view. It is shown that buy-and-hold returns from trades that mimic 
insiders generate abnormal profits in the long-term, taken as evidence that insiders trade on 
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superior private information (see e.g. Jiang and Zaman 2010; Lakonishok and Lee 2001; 
Ozkan and Trzeciakiewicz 2014; Seyhun 1986). Second, it is also shown that the market’s 
reaction to directors’ dealings is significant. While purchases made by directors are seen as a 
signal of positive information, the market’s reaction to sale transactions is generally negative 
(see, e.g., Fidrmuc, Georgen and Renneboog 2006; Jaffe 1974;). Accordingly, to the extent 
that insider trading is informative for the firm’s future performance and the market reacts to 
trades significantly in the short-term, the trading behaviour of directors prior to bankruptcy is 
also likely to be informative for the subsequent event of bankruptcy. 
In light of the above discussion, we argue that directors are likely to have additional 
incentives to trade shares preceding insolvency.  For example, they are likely to sell shares as 
the value of their holdings is expected to reduce to zero in insolvency. However, insiders may 
have incentives to impact the market’s perception of their firms by purchasing shares near 
insolvency. In both cases, directors are expected to trade shares actively prior to insolvency, 
which may generate a meaningful relationship between insider trades prior to insolvency and 
the likelihood of insolvency. Furthermore, the motives of directors for doing so are expected 
to be stronger in the period preceding the announcement of insolvency. Finally, we do not 
rule out the possibility that trades can partially be motivated by the directors’ (possibly 
biased) view that shares are under- or overvalued during the period leading up to insolvency.
3
 
The main objective of this paper is to provide further insights into the questions whether 
and how insider trading behaviour in insolvent firms prior to insolvency differs from that in 
similar solvent firms. In doing so, we examine empirically the relation between directors’ 
dealings and the probability of insolvency using a unique dataset of 474 non-financial UK 
firms, of which 117 filed for insolvency during the period 2000 to 2010. 
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 It is shown in the literature that insiders of solvent firms also trade on the basis of their contrarian beliefs, 
buying (selling) undervalued (overvalued) shares in an attempt to take advantage of any perceived 
misevaluation (Jiang and Zaman 2010). 
The analysis is carried out in two stages. First, to shed light on the patterns of directors’ 
dealings before the event of insolvency, we provide a detailed analysis of share purchases and 
sales, which are made by the directors of insolvent firms prior to insolvency. We also 
compare these trades with those made during the same period by the directors of solvent 
firms that operate within the same industry. Second, we examine the relevance of the trading 
characteristics of directors in determining the likelihood of insolvency. Specifically, we 
employ a logistic regression with a dichotomous dependent variable, taking the value of one 
if the firm goes insolvent during the sample period and otherwise zero. While in the first 
stage we examine mainly the patterns of trading characteristics before insolvency, in the 
second stage we empirically investigate the link between directors’ share dealings and the 
likelihood of insolvency. We do not assert in the paper that insider trading directly affects the 
probability of insolvency in such a way that it can be used in bankruptcy prediction models. 
Although this is not to say that insider trading has no bearing on the likelihood of insolvency, 
we argue that the distinct patterns of insider trading can be associated with the subsequently 
observed insolvency. We conjecture that the relation arises from the concerns that managers 
may have regarding the damage insolvency can inflict on their reputation and human capital. 
In both stages of our empirical analysis, three non-overlapping windows are considered to 
examine whether the trading patterns of directors change as insolvency approaches, namely 
0–6, 6–12, and 12–24 months before the last recorded insider trading activity. The most 
relevant period for understanding the trading motives of insiders in this respect is likely to be 
the months leading up to the point in time when the last trade is observed.  
Our analysis in the first stage shows that in the trading period closest to the insolvency 
date (i.e. 0-6m) insiders change their trading patterns considerably. Specifically, we find that 
during the last-trading window a significantly greater number of directors trade. Additionally, 
we observe that during this period both the total and average number of trades per director 
increase sharply. Moreover, importantly, these changes detected are largely driven by 
purchase transactions. That is, both the number of directors who purchase stocks and the total 
number of their purchase transactions increase significantly in the last trading period, while 
the sale transactions are stable across the last two trading periods. Finally, during the last 
trading period we observe that the average purchase transaction value goes up more 
significantly than the average value of sales. Our findings contrast those reported in early 
literature which present evidence on the abnormalities in insider trading patterns ahead of 
corporate bankruptcies in the US (see e.g. Gosnell, Keown and Pikerton 1992; Loderer and 
Sheenhan 1989; Ma 2001; Seyhun and Bradley 1997). They generally find that the directors’ 
insider trading decline before the bankruptcy announcement. Moreover, it is shown that 
insiders increase the volume of sales and thereby attempt to avoid significant losses in their 
holdings. 
The logistic regression analysis shows that insider trading, where the main variable of 
interest is the net purchase ratio (NPR), is significantly related to the likelihood of 
insolvency. However, the nature of the relationship between NPR and the likelihood of 
insolvency changes across the periods. While the relation is negative in the distant periods, it 
becomes positive and significant during the period preceding insolvency. The findings also 
reveal that both trade volume and the ratio of trading directors are associated positively with 
the probability of insolvency in the last period leading up to insolvency. Conversely, they 
exert a negative influence on the likelihood in the earlier two trading periods.  
 This study contributes to the literature on insider trading and corporate bankruptcies in 
several important ways. Firstly, to our knowledge, this is the first attempt in the literature to 
explore the association between insider trading and the likelihood of insolvency. By 
examining the insider trading in insolvent firms, this study provides important insights into 
our understanding of managerial behaviour in the presence of severe asymmetric information 
and costly corporate bankruptcies.  
Secondly, this paper investigates the relation between insider trading and insolvency in an 
interesting setting that has distinct characteristics in relation to corporate bankruptcy 
procedures. Compared to the US, the UK insolvency code provides stronger protection to 
creditors, making it relatively easier for creditors to force financially distressed firms into 
insolvency (Acharya, Sundaram and Kose 2011; Ozkan 1996). Moreover, whereas under 
Chapter 11 in the US the incumbent management is allowed to maintain control of the firm’s 
assets, in the UK the managers of insolvent firms surrender control to insolvency 
practitioners. Therefore, these features of the UK insolvency code, combined with the 
aforementioned expected managerial costs of insolvency, gives rise to opportunity to shed 
further light on the managerial incentives that can have implications for other stakeholders in 
the firm.  
Thirdly, our study contributes to efforts to understand the interaction between corporate 
governance characteristics and corporate bankruptcies. To the extent that good corporate 
governance reduces the cost of financing and enhances firm performance, an effective 
corporate governance structure is expected to reduce the probability of insolvency. We note 
that prior research investigating the role of corporate governance in determining the 
probability of bankruptcy is dominated by studies carried out for US firms (Daily and Dalton 
1994a&b; Fitch and Slezak 2008; Gilson 1990; Platt and Platt 2012). However, although the 
UK and the US have similar corporate governance structures, there are also enough important 
differences regarding, for example, the monitoring and disciplining of company directors by 
institutional investors. We therefore argue that these differences warrant further investigation 
into the role of corporate governance in determining the likelihood of insolvency.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the regulatory 
framework, which sets out the rules regarding directors’ dealings. Sections 3 and 4, 
respectively, describe the methodology and data used in the study. Section 5 presents the 
results of univariate and multivariate analyses, and section 6 provides a discussion on the 
findings and section 7 concludes the paper.  
2. The Regulatory Framework on Directors’ Dealings and Insolvency in the UK 
The main legislation and source of company law in the UK, which regulates the 
dealings of directors, including stock purchases and sales by directors, is the Companies Act 
2006. Under the law, directors are required to notify the company of any dealings in its shares 
no later than on the fifth business day following the transaction. Companies must in turn 
notify the Company Announcements Office of the London Stock Exchange without delay and 
no later than the end of the next business day following receipt of the information by the 
company. In addition, the Model Code on directors’ dealings, set out in Chapter 9 of the 
Listing Rules (LR9 Annex 1)
4
, provides further guidance for companies and directors in 
relation to directors’ dealings. Several of the requirements are of particular importance in the 
context of insider trading prior to insolvency. For example, regarding the purpose of 
directors’ dealings, it states that directors must not deal in any securities of the company on 
considerations of a short-term nature. The Code also requires directors not to deal during 
“close period” (also known as the blackout period) that is the period of two months preceding 
the announcement of the company’s annual or half-yearly results. More importantly, directors 
must not deal at any time when they are in possession of unpublished price-sensitive 
information in relation to the security. 
There is, to our knowledge, no separate legislation regulating directors’ dealings in 
financial distress prior to insolvency. However, the wrongful trading provision in the 
Insolvency Act 1986 (Section 214) should provide a benchmark  that directors can use to 
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judge whether a wrongful trading claim can be brought forward against them as a result of 
their trades in their own shares when their company is in financial distress. Under the law, 
directors will incur liability for wrongful trading if they continued to carry on their business 
when they knew that there was no reasonable prospect of the company avoiding insolvent 
liquidation. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that directors would stop trading in their 
shares once they have established that their company faces insolvency and hence a wrongful 
trading claim can be put forward against them in insolvent liquidation. 
The 1986 Insolvency Act establishes four routes to formal reorganization, namely 
liquidation, receivership, administration and company voluntary arrangements (CVAs). The 
most common insolvency procedure in the UK is administration. The main objective of 
administration is the survival of the company as a going concern. Although this aspect of the 
UK insolvency procedures is similar to Chapter 11 of the US, there is an important difference 
between the two procedures, which may help explain some of the insider trading 
characteristics observed in the UK. In the UK, the control of the company passes to an 
insolvency practitioner (the administrator) who takes over management and conducts the day-
to-day management of the company without any personal liability. Whereas the displacement 
of management is a significant outcome of insolvency in the UK, filing for Chapter 11 in the 
US safeguards directors’ position.  
Taken together, the loss of control can hence be used to explain why the directors in 
the UK would be reluctant to file for administration. On the other hand, it can be argued that 
the wrongful trading provision (Section 214) of the Insolvency Act 1986) provides incentives 
for directors to resort to administration as doing so would reduce the likelihood of potential 
personal liability. 
3. Methodology and determinants of insolvency likelihood 
3.1 Methodology 
We model the probability of insolvency using a logistic regression where the dependent 
variable is binary, taking the value of 1 if the firm goes insolvent and 0 otherwise. We 
estimate the following model. 
  r y        (     x     kxk) (1) 
where P(x) is the probability of the insolvency outcome occurring (i.e. the outcome y = 1) 
given the vector of explanatory variables xi. Time and industry dummies are included in all 
specifications. Although statistically significant logit coefficients of the independent variables 
indicate that they have influence on the predicted probability of insolvency, their economic 
interpretation is not as straightforward as, for instance, it is for OLS estimates. While OLS 
beta coefficients show the effect of a marginal change in explanatory variables on dependent 
variable, logit beta coefficients are expressed in terms of log-odds units, specified by 
                                                     (2) 
The signs of estimated coefficients indicate whether higher values of independent variables 
lead to a lower or higher likelihood of a y = 1 outcome. To assess how different values of x 
influence the likelihood of insolvency, one can use either odds ratios or fitted probabilities. 
The odds ratio shows how the likelihood of a y = 1 outcome (i.e. insolvency) changes 
between two values of an explanatory variable. However, given that the odds ratio requires a 
benchmark value of an independent variable, it is not helpful to estimate predicted values of a 
y = 1 outcome for a given value of x. Instead, the preferred method is first to substitute the 
desired values of explanatory variables in the estimated logit model to calculate logit odds 
value for the model. It is then, by substituting this value in Equation 2, to derive the 
probability of insolvency for a specific value of an explanatory variable while holding all 
other independent variables at their mean values.  
3.2 Determinants of the likelihood of insolvency – explanatory variables 
To examine the trading motives of insiders prior to insolvency, we consider the following 
proxies of insider trading: 1) net purchase ratio (NPR), measured as the ratio of the difference 
between aggregate purchases and sales to the sum of aggregate purchases and sales made by 
insiders, where a positive value indicates greater purchase than sale activities and vice versa; 
2) the number of transactions, given by the total number of purchases and sales made by 
insiders; and 3) the percentage of actively trading members on the board of directors. While 
the first variable is to capture the impact of the type of directors’ transactions, the last two 
variables are included to test the extent to which the trading activities of directors impact the 
likelihood of insolvency.
5
 
In our investigation, similar to previous research, we also control for several important 
accounting and market characteristics as potential determinants of the likelihood of going 
bankrupt (e.g., Altman and Narayanan 1977; Charitou, Neophytou and Chatalambous 2004; 
Shumway 2001). It is shown in this strand of the literature that leverage, firm size, stock 
returns and their volatility are the main factors that impact on the probability of bankruptcy. 
In addition, we acknowledge the potential role of corporate governance in reducing the 
agency and asymmetric information problems within corporations and hence the likelihood of 
bankruptcy (see e.g. Lajili and Zéghal 2010; Poletti-Hughes and Ozkan 2014; Sudarsanam, 
Wright and Huang 2011). The distinct UK corporate governance features, including 
insufficient external market discipline, lack of efficient monitoring of company directors by 
institutional investors, make the inclusion of firm-specific corporate governance 
characteristics in the analysis essential. Also, apart from the attributes that may facilitate 
insider trading, an effective corporate governance structure plays an important role in 
reducing the probability of insolvency through the resulting lower cost of and easier access to 
external financing (Poletti-Hughes and Ozkan 2014). 
To investigate the role of corporate governance in determining the likelihood of 
insolvency, we consider four measures, namely board size and independence, managerial and 
institutional ownership. Board size is expected to lower the likelihood of insolvency. This is 
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based on the view that small boards are more efficient and better organized than larger 
boards, which should lead to better firm performance (see, e.g., Yermack 1996). However, 
the extent to which larger boards provide firms with more business contacts firms with larger 
boards would have a lower probability of insolvency (Platt and Platt 2012). Board 
independence has been widely researched in the literature. It is argued that boards with 
greater number of independent directors are more likely to monitor and discipline the firm’s 
management, and hence help align the interests of shareholders and managers (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997). Furthermore, financially distressed firms should have a better chance of 
survival as the access of independent boards to external finance is expected to be easier, 
which is essential to avoid bankruptcy. Finally, it is also shown that the market reacts more 
positively to decisions taken by outsider-dominated firms (Borokhovich, Parrino and Trapani 
1996). Consequently, we predict that board independence is negatively associated with the 
likelihood of insolvency.  
We expect the impact of board ownership on the likelihood of insolvency to be negative. 
There is a great deal of research arguing that managerial ownership can help align the 
interests of managers and shareholders. This happens because managers bear greater part of 
the costs of their actions as their equity ownership of the firm increases (Jensen and Meckling 
1976). Better aligned interests, in turn, reduce the costs of asymmetric information and 
agency problems, lowering the likelihood of insolvency. Second, we examine the role of 
institutional ownership in determining the likelihood of bankruptcy. There are two competing 
views regarding the corporate governance role of institutional investors and hence we do not 
have a clear-cut prediction as to the role of institutional ownership in determining the 
probability of insolvency. On the one hand, the theoretical view that dominated the literature 
for years is that large institutional investors can help mitigate the effects of agency and 
information asymmetry problems in firms characterised by dispersed ownership structure. 
Compared to individual investors, they have greater voting powers when the rest of the equity 
ownership is dispersed among large number of shareholders. In line with this “active 
monitoring hypothesis”, the positive impact of institutional ownership on the quality of 
overall corporate disclosure of firms, and hence the decrease in the firm’s cost of debt 
through the reduced risk of default, is well-documented (see, e.g., Ajinkya, Bhoraj, and 
Sengupta, 2005). On the other hand, it is argued that the myopic behaviour of institutional 
investors can result in a passive corporate governance role (McConnell and Servaes 1990). In 
line with this view, it is shown that institutional investors, despite their large ownership 
position in the UK firms, do not take an active role in corporate governance, adopt a passive 
stance towards monitoring and disciplining firms’ management, and hence have little 
influence on managers (Franks, Mayer and Renneboog 2001). Moreover, institutional 
investors can collude with managers to extract private benefits and enable the firm’s 
managers to get entrenched (Pound, 1988). 
4. Data 
4.1. Sample selection 
This study is based on a unique set of data, which combines information from three 
different sources, namely Companies House, DataStream, and Morningstar UK. We start by 
identifying the listed non-financial UK firms that entered insolvency procedures over the 
period 2000 to 2010. For this purpose, we used the current activity status of companies 
posted on the Companies House website (http://www.companieshouse.gov.uk), which, in 
addition to the full name and status of companies, contains the date of filing for insolvency. 
We classify firms as insolvent by using a binary variable, with 1 representing their status as 
one of the following insolvency procedures: administration, liquidation, receivership, or 
voluntary administration; and 0 otherwise. Consequently, we identify 234 listed non-financial 
firms that entered insolvency procedures during the sample period.  
Subsequently, using International Securities Identification Numbers (ISINs), we append 
accounting and market data from the Datastream and corporate governance and insider 
trading information from the Morningstar UK. We observe that there are firms that stop 
producing financial statements well before entering insolvency, and hence we restrict our 
sample to those companies for which the gap between the date of the last available financial 
statements with fully available information and the date of entering insolvency does not 
exceed three years. As a result of this restriction, and the limited availability of corporate 
governance or insider trading data, we lose about half of the firms from our initial sample, 
and finalise the dataset with 117 insolvent companies with the complete set of information. 
The insider trading data obtained from Morningstar UK includes information on the 
transactions of all directors and other major shareholders. For our analysis, we select 
purchases and sales performed by only executive and non-executive directors on the board as 
they are more likely to be better informed than others. Trading data were collected up to two 
years before the last observed trading date that is taken as the point in time when directors are 
assumed to stop trading due to expected insolvency concerns. We find that the amount of 
time between the last trading date of directors and the date of insolvency filing is on average 
two years.
6
 Finally, we aggregated the characteristics of multiple transactions for three non-
overlapping windows, namely the six-month period prior to the last observed director trading 
date (0–6m); the earlier six-to-twelve month period (6–12m); and the preceding one-to-two 
year period (12–24m).  
To examine the likelihood of insolvency, we match the insolvent companies with those in 
the control sample, created using the following process. First, in line with previous research 
(see, e.g., Keasey and Watson 1987; Morris 1997; Piesse and Wood 1992), we choose as 
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directors of insolvent firms. This date does not necessarily correspond to the date when the financial distress is 
observed externally. The directors of insolvent firms are likely to stop trading much earlier to avoid accusations 
that they trade in company shares when they are in possession of unpublished price-sensitive information. 
many solvent companies as possible to match with the insolvent ones in terms of industry 
classification benchmark (ICB) and year of observation.  Subsequently, due to the main focus 
of the study, namely insider trading, we remove those firms from the control sample, for 
which the trading information for the period under consideration is not available. Finally, we 
limit our control sample to up to ten solvent firms for every insolvent firm, which are of 
similar size, measured by the value of total assets. As a result, we end up with a sample of 
474 firms of which 117 are insolvent.
7
 Out of four insolvency procedures, as expected, 
administration is the most frequently used insolvency procedures where 66 firms filed for it. 
There are 32 and 13 firms which filed for liquidation and receivership respectively, while 
there are only 6 firms in the sample, which were declared insolvent through voluntary 
arrangements. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Table 1 presents the composition of the firms used in the analysis. Specifically, Panel A of 
the table shows the number of insolvent and solvent firms for each year in the sample period. 
The highest number of firms observed during the period is 68 in 2003, 23 of which are 
insolvent. Moreover, there are only 14 observations in 2005, with eight solvent and six 
insolvent firms. It is also worth mentioning that there are only three insolvent firms included 
in the sample in 2009, while the total number of firms is 25. Panel B presents the distribution 
of firms across the industries classified on the basis of Industry Classification Benchmark. 
The distribution is generally well balanced across the industries with the exception of the 
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where the ratio of cases to controls is 50:50. Zmijewski (1984) finds that the sampling bias decreases as the 
ratio of cases to controls approaches that of the population. . Therefore, to reduce selection bias caused by 
overestimating the “failure” observations with regards to those of the population, we follow the one-to many 
sampling design which has been recently applied by Platt & Platt (2012) in a study of corporate board attitudes 
and bankruptcy. However, for robustness purposes, we also perform our analysis on 117 pairs of insolvent and 
solvent UK listed firms, matched on the basis of firm size and industry classification as in Platt and Platt(1990), 
and Tennyson et al (1990). The results are consistent throughout the analysis and hence are not discussed 
separately. 
technology sector, represented by only 13 (five solvent and eight insolvent) firms. Although 
not reported in the table, the average age for insolvent (solvent) firms in our sample is 16 
(17), where firm age is measured by the number of years since the firm was first listed on the 
stock exchange. All the firms in the sample are listed on the London Stock Exchange. 
4.2. Characteristics of transactions 
Table 2 presents information on several important characteristics of the open-market 
purchases and sales carried out by the directors in both solvent and insolvent firms. This 
information is provided for the three windows separately.  
Panel A reports the total number of transactions observed, together with the average 
transaction size measured both in sterling (£) terms and as a share of market value. Panel B, 
on the other hand, gives information on the volume of trade per director. In particular, it 
shows the total number of trading directors observed and their average volume of trade 
measured in sterling terms and as a share of market value. We also provide mean-difference 
tests for the values reported across insolvent and solvent firms.
8
 In discussing the results we 
focus on the last two six-month trading windows, namely 0–6m and 6–12m periods, to 
underline the changes in the pattern of trading within the last  2 months of insiders’ activity 
in insolvent firms. 
Our investigation leads to several important observations.  Starting with Panel A, firstly, it 
is clear that the number of purchase transactions increases during the last trading period. 
While the increase is observed for both solvent and insolvent firms, the changes for the group 
of insolvent firms are significantly greater. Specifically, the number of purchase transactions 
in insolvent firms increase from 152 in the 6–12m window to 413 in the 0–6m trading 
window, suggesting about a 172 percent increase. The percentage increase for the same 
variable in solvent firms is 11 percent, corresponding to an increase from 823 in the 6-12m 
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 Although we report the parametric test results for comparing the mean values of the variables across the two 
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tests. 
period to 914 transactions in the 0-6m period. Secondly, compared to purchases, there are 
fewer sale transactions during the last two trading windows. There are 48 (36) sales made by 
the insolvent-firm directors in the 0–6m (6–12m) window, corresponding to a 33 percent 
increase. The number of directors engaging in sale transactions is also small, increasing from 
26 in the 6–12m window to 33 during the last-trading period. Interestingly, compared to the 
previous six-month period, in solvent firms both the number of sale trades and the number of 
directors making these trades fall during the last-trading window, from 200 to 170 and from 
146 to 135 respectively. Finally, the average value of purchase transactions in insolvent firms 
increases in the last trading period by 35 percent from £20K to £27K. This corresponds to an 
increase in the ratio of the average value of purchase transactions to the market capitalisation 
of insolvent firms, from 0.11 to 0.15 percent. However, although the ratio also increases for 
sale transactions from 0.21 to 0.31 percent, the average value drops by about 27 percent from 
£154K in the 6-12m period to £112K in the 0-6m period. Finally, we have mixed findings for 
the solvent firms during the same windows. That is, while the average purchase (sale) 
transaction value increases (decreases) from £25K (£163K) to £30K (£133K), the average 
value ratios are more stable between the two six-month periods. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Turning to the findings in Panel B, the number of trading directors who make purchase 
transactions in insolvent firms significantly increases from 95 in the 6–12m window to (298) 
in the 0–6m trading window, suggesting about a 212 percent increase. On the other hand, the 
number of directors who make sale transactions in the last period is only 33, increasing by 
about 27 percent from 26. Furthermore, similar to the findings provided in Panel A, the 
average value of purchase transactions per director in insolvent firms also increases during 
the last trading period. Specifically, an average director’s aggregate purchase (sale) trade is 
about £37K (£164K) in this period, increased (decreased) from £32K (£213K) in the 6-12m 
period by about 16 (23) percent. Moreover, the corresponding increase in the ratio of the 
average value of purchase (sale) transactions to the market capitalisation is from 0.17 (0.29) 
to 0.20 (0.45) percent. Finally, as for the solvent firms, similar to the conclusion for Panel A, 
we argue that pattern is not clear-cut. That is, similar to insolvent firms, the average purchase 
(sale) transaction value increases (decreases) in solvent firms, namely from £43K (£223K) to 
£54K (£168K). However, the average value ratios are stable for both purchases and sales 
between the two six-month periods.
9
  
It is possible that although the directors of insolvent firms purchase shares, they may find 
it difficult to sell these shares later as the market for them becomes illiquid due to insolvency 
concerns.
10
 To investigate this issue we measure trading liquidity using a volume-related 
liquidity measure similar to that in Lee and Swaminathan (2000), and Chordia, Roll and 
Subrahmanyam (2001). Specifically, we estimated liquidity for both solvent and insolvent 
firms for all the periods considered in our estimations by the trading volume measure 
      
  
   , where Nt denotes the number of trades between t-1 and t and qi is the number 
of shares of trade i. Our findings suggest that, compared to the 6-12m period, the trading 
volume, i.e. liquidity, increases in the insolvent group of firms in the last trading window 
before insolvency, by about 56 percent. During the same period, the liquidity for solvent 
firms increases by only about 9 percent. We accordingly argue that the illiquidity of the 
insolvent firms’ shares is not likely to be a matter of concern to the directors who trade 
shares.  
Overall, the analysis of the findings presented in Table 2 suggests that the purchase 
behaviour of the insolvent-firm directors prior to insolvency is distinct and sufficiently 
unambiguous. In the last six-month trading period prior to insolvency, directors increase their 
                                                 
9
 In addition to the analysis provided in Table 2, we also examined only the last trades which were carried out 
by the directors of insolvent firms. In line with the results for the aggregated trades, we find that about 91 
percent of the last open-market insider transactions made in insolvent firms are purchase trades. On average, 
there are 1.96 trades made by the directors, of which only 0.18 are sale transactions. Also, the ratio of purchase 
transactions to market capitalisation is about 0.44 percent, compared to about 0.26 percent for the whole period.   
10
 We thank an anonymous referee for raising this point. 
purchases much more notably than sale transactions, evidenced by the significant changes in 
the number of transactions, the transaction volume measured both in sterling terms and 
relative to market value, and the number of trading directors. The analysis in this section 
suggests that the characteristics of directors’ dealings, in particular purchase trades, during 
the period prior to insolvency can be informative as to the subsequent event of insolvency. 
5. Results 
5.1. Summary statistics and univariate analysis 
In Table 3 we report the mean values and their standard deviations for the whole sample 
and separately for the solvent and insolvent firms. Furthermore, the mean difference t-test 
results for each variable are reported, where the null hypothesis is that the mean values of the 
variables across the solvent and insolvent groups are equal. We present our findings by 
grouping the variables in four categories: corporate governance, accounting and market 
variables, and directors’ trading.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Starting with the discussion of the corporate governance characteristics, the results reveal 
significant differences between solvent and insolvent firms with respect to board size, 
independence and institutional ownership. We find that the companies that filed for 
insolvency have on average smaller boards, with about six members, compared to 
approximately seven directors sitting on the average solvent firm’s board. We also show that 
the composition of the board across the two samples is significantly different. Specifically, 
the non-executive directors of insolvent firms constitute on average about 47 percent of the 
board, compared with more than 52 percent in solvent firms. The results suggest that the 
boards of solvent firms in our sample tend to be more independent than the insolvent firms. 
Despite the differences in the total number of directors represented on the board, the equity 
ownership of board members is almost the same in both groups at about 13 percent. Finally, 
we find that the average institutional ownership portfolio in the insolvent sample of firms is 
significantly higher than that for the control firms, about 31 and 21 percent respectively.  
There are also significant differences between the two samples regarding the accounting 
variables used in the analysis. Not surprisingly, the mean leverage ratio (about 28 percent) for 
insolvent firms is significantly higher than for the solvent firms (about 16 percent). Compared 
to the firms in the solvent sub-sample, insolvent firms are significantly smaller and a smaller 
percentage of them pay out dividends to shareholders during the sample period. As for the 
market variables, the stock return for insolvent firms prior to the event of insolvency is 
negative, approximately -32 percent, and significantly lower than the average return on the 
solvent firms’ stocks, which is just under    percent. The volatility of past returns is 
expectedly higher for insolvent firms. Overall, the comparison of the relevant accounting and 
market variables indicates that the insolvent firms used in the analysis exhibit greater risk and 
a higher degree of financial constraint. Moreover, the differences seem to be perceived by the 
market correctly, reflected in lower returns and greater stock return volatility.  
Turning to the results on insider trading measures, we present important differences 
between the two samples with regards to the mean values of net purchase ratio (NPR), the 
number of trades in a firm, and the insider activity ratio before the insolvency event. More 
specifically, the NPR for insolvent firms in the last trading period is significantly greater than 
that for solvent firms, which are respectively 0.70 and 0.35. This finding suggests that on 
aggregate, compared to solvent firms, the directors of insolvent firms make significantly 
more purchase than sale transactions prior to insolvency. However, the difference in the NPR 
between the two groups during the other trading periods is not statistically significant. The 
results also indicate that although the average number of trades in firms filing for insolvency 
is significantly smaller in the further trading periods, namely 6-12m and 12-24m periods, it 
becomes greater for insolvent firms in the last trading period. This is in contrast to Seyhun 
and Bradley (1997) who find that insiders mostly sell their stocks prior to insolvency. It is 
also important to observe that the average number of trades in insolvent firms increases in the 
0-6m period to 3.94 from about 1.61 in the 6-12m period. On the other hand, in solvent firms 
it increases only slightly to 3.04 from 2.87 during the same period. A similar pattern emerges 
regarding the average value of active directors. That is, while the ratio of active number of 
directors to board size is higher in an average solvent firm in the earlier periods, the ratio 
becomes significantly higher for insolvent firms in the last period. It is also worth mentioning 
that the active insiders ratio for insolvent firms increases from about 18 percent in the 6-12m 
period to 51 percent in the 0-6m period, where as it remains almost unchanged at about 25 
percent for solvent firms. This is in line with the findings of Ryan (2005), who reports that in 
situations of increased interest from analysts, insider trading volume decreases. 
Our preliminary findings indicate that the patterns of directors’ dealings differ 
significantly between the insolvent and solvent groups of firms during the relatively long 
period before the insolvency event. However, the striking finding from our analysis is that the 
directors of firms in the insolvent group increase the volume and number of their purchases 
nearer the insolvency. Combined with the findings in the previous section, our descriptive 
analysis suggests that the way in which the directors of insolvent firms trade in their own 
shares may prove to be relevant in estimating the probability of insolvency. 
5.2. Multivariate logit analysis 
This section investigates the determinants of the likelihood of insolvency. In Table 4 we 
present the results from four different logit specifications. Model 1 is our baseline model, 
estimating the likelihood of insolvency as a function of only the accounting, market and 
corporate governance variables. In Models 2 to 4 we incorporate our three measures of 
directors’ insider trading, which are the main variables of interest in our analysis. 
5.2.1. Corporate governance, accounting and market variables and the likelihood of 
insolvency 
Starting with Model 1, we find that the majority of the estimated coefficients are generally 
significant and in line with the predictions as to their impact on the likelihood of insolvency. 
Specifically, the findings for the corporate governance characteristics suggest that firms with 
larger and more independent boards are less likely to be insolvent. The negative and 
significantly estimated coefficient of board size is inconsistent with the traditional view (see, 
e.g., Yermack 1996) that small boards are more efficient and better organized than larger 
boards, which should lead to better firm performance and hence a lower probability of 
insolvency. Instead, firms with larger boards are less likely to be insolvent, supporting the 
evidence provided by Platt and Platt (2012) that larger boards probably provide firms with 
more business contacts, enabling them to avoid insolvency. However, it should be noted that 
financially distressed, in particular near-insolvent, firms are likely to lose directors prior to 
the insolvency (Darrat, Gray and Wu 2010). This may then lead to a negative relation 
between the number of directors and the insolvency event by construction, possibly partly 
explaining our finding. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
The negative impact of board independence on the likelihood of insolvency is consistent 
with the findings of prior research showing that the market reacts more positively to decisions 
taken by outsider-dominated firms (Borokhovich, Parrino and Trapani 1996) and more 
independent boards are likely to be better monitors (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). To the extent 
that boards with greater non-executive director representation are more likely to make better 
decisions and act in shareholders’ interests, greater board independence should lead to better 
performance, lower cost of capital, and hence lower the probability of financial distress. 
Furthermore, financially distressed firms should have a better chance of survival as the access 
of independent boards to external finance is expected to be easier, which is essential to avoid 
bankruptcy. 
As for the impact of equity ownership variables, we do not find a significant relation 
between board ownership and the likelihood of insolvency, while the negative sign is 
consistent with our predictions. This finding does not support the view that board ownership 
is expected to align the interests of managers and owners and therefore to reduce the costs of 
agency problems within corporations (Jensen and Meckling 1976). However, the relation 
between institutional ownership and the likelihood of insolvency is positive and highly 
significant. This provides further support for the argument that financial institutions, despite 
their large ownership position, do not take an active role in corporate governance in the UK, 
adopt a passive stance towards monitoring and disciplining firms’ management, and hence 
have little influence on managers (Franks, Mayer and Renneboog 2001).  
Not surprisingly, we find a highly significant positive association between leverage and 
the likelihood of insolvency. The estimated negative relation between dividend policy and the 
probability of insolvency, albeit rather weak, may arise because the firm’s dividend policy 
can indicate its flexibility to resort to internal resources when needed and be seen as an 
inverse proxy for the degree of financial constraint. Dividend paying firms are also expected 
to be more profitable, which would also lower the probability of insolvency. We find that 
past stock returns exert a negative and significant effect on the likelihood of insolvency. In 
addition, the volatility of stock returns is positively related to the likelihood of insolvency. 
While the high stock return volatility can increase the likelihood of insolvency per se, we also 
note that the volatility, observed during the period prior to the insolvency, may be the 
outcome of the expected insolvency. We do not investigate this issue further as we do not 
examine financial distress separately from insolvency. Finally, one result that is inconsistent 
with a priori expectations relates to firm size. Although the sign of the estimated coefficient 
of firm size is expectedly negative, suggesting a lower probability of insolvency for larger 
firms, the relation is not statistically significant. Our findings in relation to the control 
variables from the baseline model hold robustly and hence we do not discuss them again in 
the rest of the paper.  
5.2.2. Trading activity of directors and the likelihood of insolvency 
As explained earlier, in estimating the relation between insider trading and the likelihood 
of insolvency we use three different proxies in relation to the trading activity of directors. 
Moreover,  each proxy is measured over three different windows to test if the nature of 
directors’ dealings changes as the insolvency approaches, namely the six-months (0–6m), the 
six-to-twelve-months (6–12m), and the one-to-two-years (12-24m) periods prior to the date 
when the last trading was observed. In Model 2 we examine the impact of net purchase ratio 
(NPR), which is defined as the ratio of the difference between aggregate purchases and sales 
to the sum of aggregate purchases and sales made by insiders. The results reveal that the 
influence net purchase exerts on the likelihood of insolvency is positive and significant 
during the last six-month period of trading. However, the estimated relation in the earlier 
periods is negative, albeit statistically significant only in the 6-12m period. These findings are 
in support of the earlier descriptive analysis that directors increase their purchase transactions 
before they cease trading completely, possibly to reduce the risk of litigation related to 
insider trading. Also, the negative impact of NPR on the likelihood of insolvency in earlier 
periods would be in line with the view that insider purchases are informative indicating that 
managers are normally more likely to purchase when the expected future performance of 
their firms is favourable. 
In Model 3 we estimate the relation between the likelihood of insolvency and the total 
number of trades performed by insiders, used as a proxy for trading activity, without 
distinguishing between purchases and sales. The estimated coefficient of this variable in the 
first window (0–6m) is positive and highly significant. As shown earlier, the observed 
increases in the last trading period are mainly due to open market purchases rather than sales. 
It is therefore likely that the positively estimated relation between the number of insider 
transactions and the likelihood of insolvency provides further support for the suggestion that 
insiders become significantly more active in purchasing shares before they stop trading. It is 
also important to note that the positive relation is not in line with the view that insiders would 
be more cautious and diligent when trading ahead of adverse events such as insolvency. 
However, this view seems to hold for the earlier windows. The impact of the number of 
trades is negative and significant, having an opposite impact on the probability of insolvency. 
The contrast in the findings between the first and the last two trading periods further supports 
the conjecture, and our initial findings in the previous section, that the trading behaviour of 
insiders is likely to change significantly in the period leading up to insolvency. 
In Model 4 we investigate the relation between the activity of the board, measured by the 
ratio of the number of trading directors to board size, and the likelihood of entering 
insolvency. The findings are very similar to those we report above with respect to the impact 
of the number of trades on insolvency. Specifically, we find that while insider activity exerts 
a negative influence on the estimated likelihood of insolvency during the last six-month 
period, the relation is reversed during the earlier two windows. In summary, the results in 
Table 4 provide strong evidence in support of the view that the trading behaviour of directors 
before insolvency is significantly associated with the likelihood of insolvency. More 
importantly, the estimated relation is not homogeneous and changes in the opposite direction 
between the last six-months trading period and the two earlier periods.   
5.3. Sensitivity analysis: insider trading and the probability of insolvency 
As discussed earlier, the reported coefficients in Table 4 are not helpful to evaluate the 
marginal impacts of the changes in the variables of interest on the probability of insolvency. 
Therefore in Figures 1 to 3, we provide a sensitivity analysis by evaluating the predicted 
probabilities of insolvency against insider trading variables during the three trading periods. 
In all of the figures, we plot the probabilities using the models reported in Table 4. For 
example, in estimating and plotting the probability of insolvency at different levels of net 
purchase in Figure 1, we use the estimated results for Model 2. We evaluate the rest of the 
independent variables at their mean values except the categorical control variables (i.e. year 
and industry dummies), which are evaluated as though there are equal number of 
observations in each category, and therefore are equally probable. 
Overall, the plots suggest that the probability of insolvency is generally more sensitive to 
changes in insider trading measures in the last trading period (0–6m) regardless of the 
variable used in estimating the probabilities. Furthermore, the upward and downward sloping 
curves plotted in Figures 1–3 are expectedly in line with the estimated coefficients regarding 
each aspect of insider trading. Figure 1 shows that the sensitivity of the probability of 
insolvency, given by the slope, increases significantly in the 0–6 month period as the value of 
net purchase ratio (NPR) increases. For example, the probability increases from about 6 
percent to around 24 percent as the value of NPR ranges from -1 to 1. However, the 
probability of insolvency is much less sensitive to changes in NPR in the earlier windows. 
The estimated probability curve is now downward sloping in the earlier 6–12 month window. 
For the same change in NPR, the probability of insolvency drops to about 12 percent from 27 
percent. While the curve is still negatively sloped in the last period, the sensitivity is even 
lower, where the decrease in the probability for the same range of change in NPR is only 
about three percentage points.  
[Insert Figures 1 to 3 here] 
Figures 2 and 3 present a similar analysis for the number of transactions and active 
insiders respectively. Specifically, as shown in Figure 2, the probability of insolvency 
increases from about 8 percent to above 80 percent as insiders in a typical firm increase the 
number of their trades from 0 to 20 during the last six-months trading period. However, in the 
earlier two periods the slope is negative, suggesting that the probability of insolvency 
decreases as the number of trades increases. Finally, the probability of insolvency increases 
from about 8 to just under 70 percent as the ratio of directors engaged in trading goes up from 
0 to 100 percent. On the contrary, but in line with the trends reported in Figure 1 and 2, in the 
earlier windows an increase in the ratio of active traders decreases the probability of 
insolvency and at a much lower magnitude. For example, as the ratio increases from 0 to 100 
percent, the probability of insolvency decreases from about 20 (40) to less than 10 (5) percent 
in the 6–12m (12–24m) period. To sum up, the findings of the sensitivity analysis are in line 
with the regression results presented earlier. The results confirm our earlier suggestion that 
the impact of insider trading on the probability of insolvency during the last trading period 
differs significantly from that in the earlier periods.  
5.4. Additional tests  
To ensure the robustness of our results, we carried out a series of checks. First, in 
estimating the likelihood of insolvency we replace the market and accounting variables with 
the KZ Index, which is generally used in previous research as a proxy for the probability of 
financial distress and financial constraint (Almeida, Campello and Weisbach 2004; Baker, 
Stein and Wurgler 2003). The results are not reported separately but they are consistent with 
our a priori expectations that the relationship between the KZ Index and the likelihood of 
bankruptcy is positive. The influence of insider trading variables also remains in line with the 
main findings reported in Table 4.  
5.4.1. Type of transaction: purchases vs. sales 
In Table 5, we first examine if the positive relation between net purchase ratio and the 
likelihood of insolvency is mainly caused by transaction type. To do so, instead of using the 
net purchase measure, in Model 1 we incorporate purchase ratio (PR) that is defined as the 
ratio of total volume of purchase transactions made by insiders over total aggregated volume 
of insider purchases and sales. Naturally, we report only the results for purchases as the sale 
ratio is simply given by (1-PR). Moreover, for brevity, we only report the findings on the 
insider trading variables as the results for the rest of the variables remain qualitatively 
similar. Our findings are in line with those provided in Table 4. The results suggest that the 
positive relation between the transactions in the last period and the likelihood of insolvency is 
driven by purchase transactions. Specifically, the estimated coefficient of purchase ratio in 
the last trading period is positive and significant at the 1 percent level. The coefficients for 
the remaining windows are negative and statistically significant.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
We next perform a similar exercise in Model 2, where we estimate the relation between 
the number of transactions and the likelihood of insolvency, by distinguishing between 
number of sales and purchases. We find that the number of sale transactions made by 
directors exerts little influence on the likelihood of insolvency. The estimated coefficients are 
not significant in the first two windows, whilst the coefficient in the last window is negative 
and significant at the 1 percent level in the 12–24m period. The findings on the number of 
purchases, however, reveal a highly significant relationship between purchase trades and the 
likelihood of insolvency. They are also in line with our earlier interpretation of the results 
with regard to the net purchase ratio (in Model 2 of Table 4) and the size of purchases 
variable (in Model 1 of Table 5).  
5.4.2. Type of director: executive vs. non-executive 
As a final robustness test in Table 5, we consider the possibility that the relation between 
the percentages of directors engaged in trading and the insolvency probability changes 
depending on whether the trading insider is an executive or a non-executive director. In 
Model 3, we hence incorporate the percentage of executive and non-executive active trading 
directors separately. Similar to the findings for other insider trading characteristics, we find 
an asymmetry with respect to the impact of the percentage of active traders on the likelihood 
of insolvency across different windows. However, while the estimated coefficients in the 0–
6m period for both types of directors are positive, the statistical significance of the estimation 
on the active non-executive ratio is stronger. More importantly, in the last two periods the 
estimated impact of the active directors’ ratio on the probability of insolvency is significant 
only for non-executive directors. 
Finally, we also recognise that the impact of types of transaction (i.e. sales and purchases) 
may also vary with the types of directors who trade. To address this possibility we run a 
number of regressions by further classifying each type of transaction into two groups 
identified by director type. The results are in line to our earlier findings and hence are not 
reported separately. Specifically, the impact of sale transactions is insignificant regardless of 
director type and the significant impact of purchases remains unchanged.
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6. Discussion: Motivations of directors to purchase prior to insolvency 
There are two important findings of our analysis. First, we show that the directors of 
insolvent firms increase their purchases of their own shares as the formal filing for insolvency 
approaches. Second, we establish that there is clearly a positive association between purchase 
transactions and the likelihood of insolvency. These findings are not in line with what would 
normally be expected of the directors of insolvent firms. As we discussed earlier, if insiders 
are better informed than outsiders they should avoid purchasing stocks prior to insolvency, 
which leads to a prediction that purchase transactions are negatively associated with the 
probability of insolvency. This superior information prediction is also supported with the 
evidence provided by previous research, which shows that the changes in the trading patterns 
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 For robustness purposes, in order to account for the effect of the amount of time (t) between the date of 
directors last trading and the date of insolvency filing, on the estimated by logistic regression associations, we 
perform additional analysis with the application of proportional Cox hazard model on the single-period data. In 
this context, the superior feature of the semi-parametric Cox hazard model relates to the treatment of differences 
in time t between the firms. In particular, the model compares subjects when values of t are identical, and 
therefore share the same risk of the event. The results obtained from the Cox hazard model are in line with 
findings provided by the logistic regression models presented in section 5.2., and are available from authors 
upon request. 
of insiders before major price-relevant corporate announcements are consistent with the 
subsequent event (e.g. seasoned equity offerings (Karpoff and Lee 1991), dividend initiations 
and/or cuts (Kose and Lang 1991), stock repurchases (Lee, Mikkelson and Partch 1992), and 
mergers and acquisitions (Seyhun 1990)). Accordingly, we conclude that the purchase 
transactions of directors prior to insolvency are unlikely to be driven by directors’ superior 
information about the imminent insolvency. In the following, we explore several potential 
reasons for the directors of insolvent firms to trade in their own shares and in particular to 
increase their purchases notably. 
 
6.1. Signalling motives and litigation risk 
One explanation relates to the possibility that insiders may purchase shares in an attempt 
to affect the market’s perception of the firm’s financial situation and hence to reduce the 
probability of insolvency. This is more likely to happen in severe financial distress when the 
probability of insolvency is significantly high. Managers, compared to other stakeholders in 
the firm, are known to have stronger incentives to avoid bankruptcy. It is well established in 
the literature that insolvencies are costly to all the stakeholders of the firm. However, the 
costs that are born by managers are significantly higher as they also have their human capital 
invested in the firm (Eckbo, Thorburn and Wang 2012; Gilson 1989). It is therefore 
reasonable to assume that directors may have incentives to affect the market’s sentiment 
through their purchase activities if doing so is likely to reduce the likelihood of insolvency or 
delay it. It is also important to note that these incentives are likely to be stronger in the UK 
for at least two reasons. First, compared to many other bankruptcy codes, in particular to the 
US code, the UK insolvency code is known to be more favourable to creditors, leading to a 
greater probability of insolvency when companies are in financial distress (Acharya, 
Sundaram and Kose 2011; Ozkan 1996). Second, in contrast to the US where under Chapter 
   the incumbent management is allowed to maintain control of the firm’s assets and its 
operations, in the UK the managers of insolvent firms surrender control to insolvency 
practitioners. Put together, these arguments form the view that it may be reasonable to expect 
directors to purchase their own shares if there is any scope for avoiding or delaying the 
insolvency. At least, given the evidence in the literature in favour of the positive short-term 
reaction of the market to purchase transactions by insiders, the efforts of directors to impact 
the market’s perception of the firm through purchases can be seen to some extent reasonable 
and desirable.  
Testing the signalling motives of directors to purchase shares prior to insolvency requires 
a different framework from that adopted in this paper and is also beyond the objective of this 
paper. However, in Table 6 we provide cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for up to five 
trading days following the announcement day.  We estimate the market-adjusted abnormal 
return for firm i on day t as ARi,t = Ri,t – Rm,t, where Ri,t is the daily return for the traded share 
i on day t and Rm,t is the return on the value-weighted FTSE All-Share
12
 index on the same 
day (Croci et al, 2010).  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
We report CARs for five different windows, namely CAR(0,1) to CAR(0,5) where, for 
example, CAR(0,1) gives the cumulative abnormal return on the first trading day following 
the announcement of insider trading, given as day 0. For purchase transactions made by 
insiders, the CARs in all of the windows are positive. However, the strongest positive results 
are observed during the last trading period, 0-6m. Sale transactions, on the other hand, 
generate significantly lower, and negative, CARs in the last trading period.  The difference in 
the CARs of insiders’ purchases and sales are statistically significant in the  -6m period, 
suggesting that the market reaction to purchases and sales differs significantly. This finding is 
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 FTSE ALL-Share Index represents about 99 percent of UK market capitalization, aggregating of the FTSE 
100, FTSE 250 and FTSE Small Cap Indices (http://www.ftse.com/Indices/UK_Indices). Each company in the 
Index is first weighted using the number of shares-in-issue and the share price. Then, the free float factor is 
incorporated to arrive at the final weight, considering only the shares available for trading and hence ignoring 
those shares held by restricted shareholders such as family owners.  
in line with Fidrmuc, Georgen and Renneboog (2006), which also shows that the market 
reaction to both purchases and sales in poorly performing and financially distressed firms is 
stronger. Interestingly, the CARs of directors’ purchases and sales in earlier periods are either 
insignificant or weakly significant in few cases. Moreover, CARs for sales are positive, 
contrasting our findings for the 0-6m trading period. This result might suggest that the market 
perceives that transactions made in the verge of insolvency (0-6m window) carry more 
information than those in earlier periods.    
The directors of financially distressed firms may also want to reduce their sale and/or 
increase their purchase transactions before insolvency to minimise the risk of litigation. As 
we discussed earlier, the relevant risk in the UK in this respect is that of wrongful trading, 
which can be brought forward against directors if it can be shown that they traded when they 
knew that there was no reasonable prospect of the company avoiding insolvent liquidation. 
Also in line with the litigation risk view of insider trading, it is shown in prior studies that 
insiders, in an attempt to reduce their risk exposure, decrease their timely trades before major 
events. Specifically, insiders reduce sales and increase purchases ahead of negative and 
positive news respectively (see, e.g., Chen, Martin and Wang 2013; Seyhun 1992). 
6.2. Managerial bias 
The above explanations of directors’ incentives to purchase prior to insolvency are based 
on the assumption that directors are generally rational. In that framework, directors act 
rationally in their own best interest by exploiting the asymmetric information with regard to 
the likelihood of insolvency, though not necessarily, at the expense of outsiders.  
The assumption of rationality may however not hold. It is also possible that directors can 
be irrational and therefore biased in their perception of the likelihood of insolvency and the 
future prospects of their firms. One of the behavioural managerial biases affecting their 
trading behaviour may be the level of their overconfidence. In particular, in the context of 
this study, overconfident directors might underestimate the likelihood of insolvency and/or 
overestimate the expected future returns as a consequence of their illusion of control and the 
commitment to good outcomes. Insiders may then choose to purchase shares, with a belief 
that the firm is undervalued and its chance of survival is significant enough. In other words 
directors trading in these circumstances would expect to earn abnormal returns. 
The most robust method to proxy the level of managerial confidence was developed by 
Malmendier and Tate (2005) in their study on US data. Building their proxies upon the CEOs 
behaviour related to exercise of granted to them stock options, they generally claim that the 
executives who hold their options until the expiration date can be classified as overconfident; 
since they must believe that their leadership will lead to continuously good performance of a 
firm. 
In the UK a life span of vast majority of managerial stock options is 10 years, with a 
vesting period of 3 years (Croci et al., 2010). As it is mentioned above, the trading that we 
imply can be motivated by managerial overconfidence occurs in the last 6 months window of 
our insolvent-firms observation period. During this window in insolvent firms we observe 
among the insider traders only 51 distinct CEOs. The average of 3 years tenure of the 
executives at the time of observation in our sample (and the median of 1 year) does not give 
us an opportunity to test in a robust manner the overconfidence motivation, since as it is 
outlined above in the UK managerial options are exercisable 3 years after they were granted.  
 Still, in order to shed light on the relevance of managerial biases in determining the 
outcome of severe financial distress, we attempt to provide some preliminary descriptive 
analysis. Following Schrand & Zechman (2012) we employ three CEO characteristics that 
might constitute as a proxy for overconfidence. First, we consider CEO’s tenure which has 
been associated with an increase of the perceived controllability which results in optimistic 
bias (Weinstein and Klein, 1996). Also, Malmendier et al. (2011) and Hirshleifer et al. (2012) 
find that overconfident CEOs have significantly longer tenures. CEO tenure is normally used 
to measure managerial ability, so it would not be surprising that ability is associated with 
confidence. Second, we consider whether the CEO is also the founder or co-founder of the 
company. A founder CEO holds a formal position in the organizational hierarchy and 
possesses unique competencies at firm specific level, which might contribute to 
overconfidence (Galema et al., 2012). As our third measure, we consider the level of 
education. Education is a measure of expertise which might proxy overconfidence, in the 
sense that expertise might make individuals to believe that they are better than average at a 
task (Schrand & Zechman, 2012).  
In what follows we classify a CEO as overconfident using any (either or) of the following 
criteria. First, based on CEO’s tenure, we choose the top 25 percent, which classifies a CEO 
with tenure of five years or more as overconfident. CEO tenure is measured as a continuous 
variable equal to the number of years between the CEO’s start date at such position in the 
company and the year of the insider trade. Second, founder is a dummy variable that equals 
one if the CEO is also the founder of the company. Third, education is a discrete variable 
which gives the following values: No college ( ); Bachelor’s degree ( ); Master’s degree or 
 rofessional Qualification (2); two Master’s degrees (2.5); Doctorate degree (3); and classify 
in the overconfident group those individuals who have a level of education of (2) or more. 
Using a proxy based on the outlined above methodology, we distinguish between 
transactions made by overconfident or not, managers. In line with the discussion above, it is 
expected that overconfident CEOs make more purchases in volume and value than others 
before insolvency. Based on analysis of 68 purchase transactions made by all CEOs in our 
sample, we were however unsuccessful in providing a significant and robust support to this 
prediction. 
7. Conclusion 
This paper provides an empirical investigation on the determinants of the likelihood of 
insolvency. The main objective is to examine if insider transactions performed by company 
directors before insolvency are associated with the event. To do so, the study distinguishes 
between open-market purchase and sale transactions made by the directors of a sample of 
both solvent and insolvent firms in the UK during the period 2000 to 2010. Furthermore, the 
trading period prior to insolvency is divided into three distinct sub-periods to investigate 
whether the trading behaviour of directors change nearer the insolvency event.  
Our analysis provides clear-cut evidence that insiders increase their purchase transactions 
significantly in the period leading to insolvency. The results from the logistic regression 
analysis also support this finding, revealing a positive relationship between net purchase and 
the probability of insolvency only in the six-months trading period before the insolvency. In 
more distant periods the relation is negative and insignificant. The results hold when the 
analysis is repeated by incorporating purchase and sale trades in separate estimations. 
Specifically, there is a positive relation between purchases and the likelihood of insolvency 
only during the last trading period. However, there is no convincing evidence for the 
existence of a significant relation between sale transactions and the likelihood of insolvency 
during the same window of trading. Finally, we find that the relation between insider trading 
characteristics and the likelihood of insolvency is similar across executive and non-executive 
directors’ dealings. 
We also find that board size and independence, and the equity ownership of institutional 
investors are significant corporate governance characteristics in determining the probability 
of insolvency. Interestingly, the negative impact of board size and the positive influence of 
institutional ownership on insolvency are not consistent with what previous corporate 
governance and bankruptcy prediction studies show. We argue that the differences in the 
interplay between these firm-specific governance features and the likelihood of insolvency 
are due to the specific characteristics of the corporate governance system in the UK. 
 Overall, the findings of our study point to the importance of insider trading characteristics 
in determining the probability of insolvency. An avenue for future research is to further 
distinguish between different directors by focusing on the potential differences regarding the 
incentives of, for example, firms’ CEOs and CFOs. It is also important to incorporate 
country-specific information in the analysis with regard to insider trading, bankruptcy 
procedures, and corporate governance characteristics to provide more insights into 
bankruptcy prediction models.  
Finally, the findings of our analysis may partly arise from the biased view of irrational 
investors. Distinguishing between rational and irrational trading motives of directors is hence 
important in investigating the relationship between directors’ dealings and the likelihood of 
insolvency. Equally, it is important, though challenging, to test if the increasing efforts of 
insiders in insolvent firms to influence the market’s perception during the period preceding 
the insolvency are successful for some firms in avoiding bankruptcy. This awaits future 
research. 
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9. Tables and Figures 
Jannine - Please refer to the excel spreadsheet. 
I am working on adding significance levels to the table of CARs, will update you once they 
are ready.  
